Military integration – the process of incorporating armed groups into a statutory security framework – has been a feature of approximately one-third of all documented peace processes since 1990. It is distinct from disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), the process through which ex-combatants are reintegrated into civilian society. A relatively under-examined aspect of post-conflict transition, military integration is a peace-building strategy that has been employed with mixed results in countries such as Angola, Burundi, Mozambique and South Africa.

In South Sudan, military integration has been underway since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan’s second civil war in 2005. Agreed between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – the principal southern resistance movement during the second civil war – and the central Sudanese government, this comprised a set of protocols and agreements between the two sides, notably providing a framework creating conditions for a referendum on South Sudanese independence, held in 2011. When the CPA was signed, there were nearly 50,000 members of up to sixty so-called ‘other armed groups’ (OAGs), which included rivals to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) – the SPLM’s military wing, which is now the armed forces of South Sudan. Recognising the threat that these groups posed to stability during the interim period of the CPA (2005–11) and beyond, the preferred approach of the government of South Sudan has focused less on coercion and more on accommodation, which entails negotiating amnesties with armed-group leaders and integrating their forces into the SPLA.

While largely neutralising the threat that armed groups pose to South Sudan, the government’s amnesty and integration approach has been fraught with implementation challenges. As military integration is a process that requires careful management, the case of South Sudan provides insight into the potential options available to post-conflict governments in facilitating the integration of former adversaries into the statutory security services, and the factors that can derail this process. Accordingly, this article surveys the recent history of armed groups in southern Sudan, followed by an analysis of the post-war balancing act performed by the government in the integration of such groups into the SPLA.

Historical Context of Armed Groups
The roots of South Sudan’s ongoing military-integration challenges lie in the disintegration of the southern resistance movement in the 1990s and the subsequent proliferation of other armed groups in southern Sudan opposed to the SPLM/A. Prior to the formation of the SPLM/A in 1983, remnants of Anyanya, the primarily Nuer rebel group active in the south during the first Sudanese civil war (1956–72), had started to rearm in eastern Upper Nile State as a result of the steady breakdown of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972. These groups, whose leaders had held more senior military ranks to SPLA leader John Garang, gathered under the umbrella ‘Anyanya II’ and soon came into competition with the primarily Dinka-led SPLA over leadership of the armed resistance in the south.

From its founding, the SPLM/A sought to avoid the mistakes Anyanya had made during the first civil war – most notably, its explicit aspiration for
South Sudanese independence, which alienated the movement from potential allies within Sudan and abroad. Despite a preference on the part of some southerners for independence, Garang did not see the SPLM/A as a separatist movement, but rather as a revolution aimed at transforming a united Sudan through the replacement of the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) regime in Khartoum with a secular, democratically elected government. Considering the regional and international context of the time, Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ vision was more likely to gain foreign support than a platform rooted in secession.

By the late 1980s, the SPLA had defeated much of Anyanya II, and some of its fighters eventually joined the SPLA. Yet some remnants of Anyanya II, which opposed the SPLA’s aspiration for a united ‘New Sudan’, instead opted to pursue a tactical alliance with the ruling regime in Khartoum in an attempt to destabilise the SPLA and subsequently gain control of the southern armed resistance. Nonetheless, by this time, the SPLA had also achieved various successes against the Sudanese benefiting from the political direction, training, arms, bases, logistics support and secure supply lines provided by the Derg regime in neighbouring Ethiopia. However, with the collapse of the Derg in May 1991 and the loss of Ethiopian support, the SPLA’s momentum slowed and Garang’s power began to wane. In August of that year, when both the movement and its leader were at their weakest, Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong – all members of the SPLM/A Political-Military High Command – attempted to unseat Garang as chairman of the SPLM/A, announcing their intentions from the city of Nasir in Greater Upper Nile.

The architects of what came to be called the ‘Nasir coup’ were motivated by feelings of animosity and jealousy towards Garang, as well as by the opportunity to capitalise on a slew of grievances against him in the south. The SPLM/A’s centralised command structure and Garang’s controversial and divisive style of leadership had created tensions within the movement, with Garang having had several prominent SPLA leaders arrested, executed, charged with insubordination and subjected to imprisonment under harsh conditions.

The Dinka domination of the SPLA also generated resentment, particularly given the perception that other southern ethnic groups were being marginalised within the movement. Finally, members of the Nasir faction – known as SPLM/A-Nasir – hoped that by distinguishing themselves from Garang’s unionist rhetoric, other SPLA commanders might rally to a more explicitly secessionist cause. With the creation of new post-Soviet states and Eritrea’s imminent independence, SPLM/A-Nasir also believed that there might be opportunities to gain foreign support.

Contrary to the expectations of Machar, Akol and Kong, however, the Nasir coup did not result in an upsurge in support in the south. Commanders who might have responded to the coup were more receptive to reform within the SPLA than to a change in leadership – a view amplified by the SPLA’s weakened position in the aftermath of the loss of Ethiopian support. Only Nuer commanders around Nasir rallied to the cause, while Akol’s Shilluk kinsmen refused to join him in siding with the Nasir faction. These factors transformed
the Nasir coup, the original intention of which had been to alter the leadership of the SPLA, into an ethnic conflict between Dinka and Nuer, unleashing a ‘civil war within a civil war’ in the south. Some of the worst atrocities within the broader north–south conflict occurred in southern Sudan in the aftermath of the Nasir coup. In an attempt to encourage fence-sitters to defect to SPLM/A-Nasir, Machar took the fight to Garang’s home turf in Jonglei State. This plan backfired when the prospect of a Nuer invasion of primarily Dinka-inhabited areas and the slaughter of Dinka civilians turned southern and international opinion against the Nasir faction. The end result was the solidification of Garang’s control of the southern resistance – now called SPLM/A-Mainstream – and his continued monopoly on foreign support. Meanwhile, like Anyanya II before it, SPLM/A-Nasir was forced to form an alliance of convenience with the NIF regime in Khartoum.

Capitalising on the split within the SPLA, the government of Sudan stepped up ongoing efforts to encourage factionalism in the south by funnelling arms, food, large sums of money and other supplies to a loose assortment of SPLA splinter groups, using these groups as proxies to compensate for the Sudanese military’s previous lack of success on the battlefield. In an attempt to prevent the emergence of a cohesive command structure with the political clout to represent southern interests, the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) Military Intelligence maintained separate relationships with individual commanders of these SPLA splinter groups, even encouraging local-level commanders to challenge their superiors or form breakaway factions. Some commanders of anti-SPLA armed groups had formal commissions in the SAF, and were offered rewards of cash, cattle and houses in Khartoum to guarantee their acquiescence. Although reliance on a regime determined to thwart independence created a clear ideological dissonance with their secessionist platforms, these groups saw Khartoum’s support as a means to fight the near enemy – the SPLA – before turning their attention to the far enemy – the Sudanese government itself. Nevertheless, this dissonance ultimately cost these factions their political credibility.

**Armed Groups during CPA Negotiations**

There were many attempts to negotiate an end to Sudan’s second civil war throughout the 1990s. After a decade of false starts, the peace process brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – a regional organisation established in 1996 to focus on development and regional security – eventually led to the signing of the CPA. With a narrow focus on brokered peace between the NIF – and the National Congress Party that succeeded it – and the SPLM, IGAD mediators erroneously assumed that each party would also represent the interests of the political opposition and armed groups in the north and south, respectively. In fact, such groups had repeatedly requested formal or observer status for the IGAD peace process, and the failure to accommodate them meant that the CPA firmly entrenched parties with no democratic legitimacy in power. In both the north and south, this approach created many potential spoilers to the peace process.

Following the signing in 2002 of the Machakos Protocol, the first of the agreements that came to comprise the CPA, violence between the SPLA and its rivals in the south, such as the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) and various ethnically defined local self-defence militias, increased. Referred to in the CPA as OAGs, these groups, most notably the SSDF, possessed the numbers, weapons, military capabilities and strategic locations to derail the peace process. As per the Agreement on Security Arrangements, during the Interim Period, armed groups outside the SPLA and the SAF were prohibited from operating in Sudan or southern Sudan, and had the option of being incorporated into the organised forces (such as the army, police, prisons and wildlife forces) of either polity or being reintegrated into the civil service or civil-society institutions. As per the subsequent Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, within twelve months of the signing of the CPA – by January 2006 – all members of OAGs not aligned with the SPLA were expected to have demobilised or to have redeployed north to be integrated into the SAF. After the CPA was signed, there were fears that if a deal were not reached between the SPLM/A and the OAGs, Khartoum would continue to support anti-SPLA groups in the south, making the region ungovernable, and thus undermining the implementation of the peace agreement during the six-year (2005–11) interim period.

As such, the CPA overemphasised the north–south dynamic of the conflict, and accordingly lacked explicit provisions for south–south peace. As CPA negotiations progressed, the SPLA made several attempts to pursue reconciliation with the SSDF and other OAGs. However, these were compromised by the legacy of wartime atrocities perpetrated by all sides, which contributed to an environment of mistrust and antagonism. Furthermore, many OAG leaders harboured personal grudges against Garang as a result of his authoritarian leadership and his ideological preference for a united ‘New Sudan’, while Garang himself was often dismissive of OAGs, referring to them as government of Sudan-sponsored militias. Indeed, as the bearer of a much-desired peace agreement, Garang believed himself to be in a strong negotiating position, and his intransigence with regard to the specifics of reconciliation efforts impeded their progress. For example, fearing that the integration of such a large group of Nuer into the SPLA would dilute his leadership, he opposed the integration of the SSDF, instead encouraging individual SSDF commanders to defect. The issue of accommodation between the SPLA and OAGs was thus unresolved by the signing of the CPA, and remained so until Garang’s death in July 2005.

**The Juba Declaration**

Relations between the SPLM/A and the SSDF showed marked improvement in the aftermath of Garang’s death as his successor, Salva Kiir, was more amenable to south–south dialogue. Kiir prioritised finding ways in which the SSDF could buy into the CPA and later, as president of the
independent Republic of South Sudan, became instrumental in accommodating former adversaries into the structures of the new post-CPA polity.\textsuperscript{16} In January 2006, after negotiating an agreement with the SSDF, Kiir issued the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration. Its terms included an immediate cessation of hostilities; a declaration of amnesty to cover any criminal acts committed during previous periods of hostilities; the integration of the SPLA and the SSDF in the formation of a unified, non-partisan army; and an appeal to forces outside the SPLA and the SSDF to join the process of reconciliation.\textsuperscript{17} In line with this agreement, SSDF Chief of Staff Paulino Matip became deputy commander-in-chief of the SPLA until his death in August 2012.

The Juba Declaration greatly diminished the threat that OAGs posed as spoilers during the interim period, and may have been of equal or even greater importance than the CPA itself in both averting a potential civil war within southern Sudan and paving the way for South Sudan’s independence in 2011.\textsuperscript{18} Many members of other OAGs also chose to integrate into the SPLA, swelling its ranks to approximately 140,000 soldiers, while some remained part of the SAF, as was their prerogative according to the CPA. Others avoided integration into either the SPLA or the SAF and maintained open lines of communication with Khartoum, yet largely refrained from violence to avoid derailing the referendum that would determine whether southern Sudan remained part of Sudan or became the independent Republic of South Sudan.\textsuperscript{19}

The Amnesty and Integration Approach Begins to Fall Apart

The amnesty and integration policy that emerged from the Juba Declaration provided an element of stability during the interim period of the CPA. However, the manner in which the SPLM handled the electoral process in southern Sudan in April 2010 demonstrated how a lack of fair political competition could erode this relative stability. In southern Sudan, elections for the presidency, the legislative assembly, governorships and state assemblies could have been a means by which those excluded from the peace process might attempt to influence the shape of the future potentially independent state, albeit indirectly.\textsuperscript{20} However, during the candidate-selection process, the SPLM was accused of hand-picking parliamentary and gubernatorial candidates who had not been chosen by the people residing in various constituencies. In response, over 300 individual members of the SPLM stood as independents against officially sanctioned SPLM candidates.\textsuperscript{41} During the elections, there were allegations of fraudulent and exclusionary practices, and of intimidation and vote-rigging.\textsuperscript{42}

Although some independents, such as Angelina Teny, wife of then-Vice President Riek Machar, and Peter Adwok Nyaba had previously been threatened with expulsion from the party, they were compensated with government posts after their losses in the election.\textsuperscript{43} Others, disenchanted with their exclusion from the new political dispensation, concluded that armed violence was the only option for any disenfranchised group wishing to influence South Sudan’s system of governance.\textsuperscript{44} After the elections, an assortment of armed groups proliferated in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States. Although some armed-group leaders were motivated by opportunism and greed, others – such as the late Lieutenant General George Athor, the late Colonel Gatluak Gai, and David Yau Yau – had grievances linked to the flawed electoral process: Athor was a former long-time SPLA loyalist whose independent candidacy for governor of Jonglei State failed; Gai was a Nuer SPLA officer who had been expecting a county commissioner post in Unity State if independent candidate Angelina Teny had defeated incumbent Governor Taban Deng Gai; and Yau Yau was formerly a theology student and a member of the Murle ethnic group who failed as an independent candidate for the state assembly in Jonglei.

The rebellions of anti-SPLM/A armed groups coincided with ongoing Dinka–Nuer–Murle communal violence in the Greater Upper Nile region, where small-arms proliferation, the availability of young male fighters, the inability of the government to provide security, and the security forces’ heavy-handed and uneven civilian-disarmament campaigns fanned local grievances between ethnic groups and against the state.\textsuperscript{45} Unlike the armed movements led by the likes of Athor, Gai, Yau Yau, as well as those led by Gabriel Tanginye and the serial defector Peter Gadet, these groups tended to be ethnically defined local militias more concerned with the protection of their communities and property from rival ethnic groups than with attaining political power. Yet lines between these groups were blurred, as leaders like Athor and Yau Yau were able to capitalise on the grievances of local ethnic militias to gain manpower for their armed groups to further destabilise the South Sudanese state-to-be.\textsuperscript{46}

In response to this proliferation of armed groups, Kiir repeated his offer of amnesty prior to the 2011 referendum, reiterating this in his speech marking South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011.\textsuperscript{47} By the end of that year, many armed-group leaders had either been placed under house arrest or killed as a result of infighting or in skirmishes with the SPLA. Yet others accepted the government’s offer of amnesty and negotiated the integration of their forces into the SPLA.

How the Amnesty and Integration Process Works

Most amnesty and integration processes in South Sudan are initiated by the Office of the President and the Ministry for National Security, where the political decision to offer amnesty to armed-group commanders is made and the terms of the deals are negotiated.\textsuperscript{48} The currency of these negotiations takes the form of military promotions, positions in government, cash, cars, houses, free accommodation during the integration period and promises of regular salaries once integrated.\textsuperscript{49} The type of amnesty and integration package leaders of armed groups receive is contingent on their specific ‘threat potential’, which can be understood in terms of commanders’ ability to secure external funding or to mobilise fighters.\textsuperscript{50}

Once amnesty and integration negotiations are finalised, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MoD) and
the SPLA are instructed to integrate the agreed number of armed-group members. Rather than submitting armed groups to the DDR process, the government has preferred to integrate them into the SPLA, to dilute their cohesion before deciding whether or not to include them in a larger pool of DDR candidates at a later date. This approach is based on the theory that integrated armed groups that are well absorbed within SPLA command and control will pose less of a threat if and when they are demobilised.

Although the amnesty and integration process seems straightforward, it has many moving pieces and potential points of failure. In addition, as of autumn 2012, there was no single body within the national government that was responsible for overseeing the process from start to finish. Amnesty and integration negotiations can include stakeholders from SPLA commanders to government ministers, members of local government and church organisations, depending on their previous relationships with armed-group commanders, the area in which the rebellion had been taking place, and the particular grievance at hand. Yet if too many stakeholders become involved, this can lead armed-group leaders to seek to increase the value of their amnesty and integration packages, further drawing out the negotiation process. Moreover, there have been repeated instances in which an armed-group commander would accept amnesty, only subsequently to renege on the integration deal, possibly in an attempt to recruit additional men or to improve his negotiating position.

The terms of the negotiations agreed to by the Office of the President and the Ministry for National Security in the political sphere can also be subject to resistance on the part of the MoD and the SPLA in the military sphere. In addition to often being unable to fulfil the promises made during negotiations, the military resents the fact that former adversaries are ‘rewarded’ for their rebellions with integration into the SPLA. This sentiment has been reinforced by the fact that many members of the SSDF who had previously opted for integration into the SAF had been promoted above their abilities in an attempt by the SAF to make integration into the SPLA less attractive, creating an abundance of high-ranking officers among former SSDF personnel. This has diluted the position of SPLA officers within the military hierarchy, placing the SPLA’s erstwhile enemies in positions of equal or higher rank by comparison.

Certainly, rank harmonisation has been a serious challenge, and has at times been a red line in the implementation of integration deals. With integrated armed groups in possession of diverse training backgrounds, ranks and allegiances, seniority within the SPLA has been difficult to determine. Many in the SSDF were poorly trained, had below-average levels of literacy, and were more likely to have received military training in the bush than through service in organised security forces. Regardless, the level of seniority obtained by integrated forces is often a function of the terms of their specific amnesty and integration deals. Consequently, the SPLA has developed an inflated officer corps, with too many commanding officers relative to the number of soldiers. This impedes the ability of these officers to command a given division effectively in the field, for example, when commanders, deputy commanders and chiefs of staff are all at the two-star level.

Finally, the integration of armed groups into the SPLA is limited by the latter’s absorptive capacity, as it counteracts the concurrent imperative to right-size the military from an estimated parade of more than 210,000 men down to 120,000 in alignment with Objective Force 2017 – the SPLA’s strategy to transform itself from a guerrilla force into a professional, conventional, modern military. Military integration thus increases the costs imposed by the security sector on the nascent Republic of South Sudan, with the government spending almost 50 per cent of its budget on the MoD and the SPLA, of which over 80 per cent is on salaries. This expenditure on salaries comes at the expense of investment in military professionalisation, training, logistics and mobility, in turn undermining the development of the SPLA’s capacity to deploy to the periphery to deter communal violence.

_{Conclusion_}

As a newly independent state, South Sudan continues to manage the latent threat posed by anti-government armed groups through an approach based on amnesty and military integration. With the exception of the rebellion led by David Yau Yau, most of the armed groups that proliferated since 2010 have been defeated or integrated into the SPLA. Nonetheless, the factors that could contribute to future armed-group proliferation – namely greed, opportunism and political grievances – remain. Accordingly, the government’s approach to neutralising armed groups has several vulnerabilities. Amnesty and integration is a complex process with many stakeholders and corresponding demands that need to be fulfilled, making these deals easy to derail and challenging to fulfill. Due to the fact that the government is essentially rewarding former defectors for their disloyalty, there have been indications of MoD and SPLA resistance to the process. In addition, with a need to demobilise between 90,000 and 110,000 soldiers to meet the goals set out in Objective Force 2017, the amnesty and integration process counteracts efforts to right-size the SPLA and transform it into a coherent, professional and conventional military. Furthermore, amnesty and integration adds to the financial burden posed by the security sector, which means that the salaries of non-essential personnel detract funding from training and equipment. This prevents the SPLA from transforming from a consumer of public goods to a provider of a public good, in the form of security.

These challenges have a wider impact on the government’s claim on the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within the territory of South Sudan, and contribute to the SPLA’s inability to deter inter-communal violence. This in turn leads to small-arms proliferation, thereby perpetuating the cycle of violence. Without civilian protection, there are no incentives for civilians to abstain from taking the law into their own hands. While preventing such violence is ostensibly a law-enforcement function, the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS)
lacks the requisite capacity to do so, making the SPLA the de facto principal security provider.\(^6\)

Notably, the government’s amnesty and integration approach only goes so far, since political accommodation is also necessary to stem the proliferation of armed groups. Periods of political competition such as elections, for example, can add an element of stress to the process of military integration, with incentives for defection increasing due to exclusion from the political process. A key lesson from South Sudan’s experience with armed groups in 2010–11 is that individuals and groups excluded from the political process may believe that their only recourse is to take up arms in rebellion against the government. Depending on the ruling SPLM’s inclusiveness and fair approach – or lack thereof – to the elections in 2015, there may be a corresponding proliferation of armed groups.

Overall, the amnesty and integration process in South Sudan has created strong incentives for armed-group commanders to renew their rebellions, for recently integrated soldiers to defect in order to obtain their own integration deals, and for long-time SPLA loyalists to defect in pursuit of increased pay or promotion.\(^67\) Indeed, the government’s approach has been described as a ‘cycle of integration, disintegration, resolution, co-option and integration’,\(^68\) and characterised as simply ‘paying the soldiers not to fight the government’.\(^69\) Yet, not integrating such groups into the SPLA would lead to increased instability in parts of South Sudan. While imperfect, the government of South Sudan’s deliberate, delicately balanced approach is one that is most likely to successfully mitigate the latent threat posed by armed groups.\(^70\)

Lesley Anne Warner is a Research Fellow at the Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University and a PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London. This research was conducted while she was an Africa Analyst at CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies, working on security co-operation and dynamics of armed conflict.

Notes


4 The focus of this article is on non-statutory armed forces that were not recognised by the CPA, the 2005 Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, the 2005 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan or the 2011 Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. Examples of non-statutory armed forces are those referred to as OAGs in the CPA, including the armed groups led by individuals such as David Yau Yau and the late George Athor. This article does not focus on ethnically defined local militias, such as the Lou Nuer and Murle groups, which periodically perpetrate communal violence in Jonglei State, since the government’s approach to such groups has been, with few exceptions, one of civilian disarmament rather than integration into the SPLA.


7 For a discussion of Garang’s efforts to reconcile his belief in a ‘New Sudan’ with the demands of many southerners for independence, see Robert O Collins, *Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan*, p. 129 and Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*, pp. 64–65. Garang had hoped that the south’s participation in a government of national unity (after the overthrow of the regime in Khartoum), plus an interim period before a referendum on self-determination, would allow time to heal the wounds.
influenced by the war, and allow the south's future to continue to be tied to that of the north.


12 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 98.


16 Collins, Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan, p. 94; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 73.

17 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 73.

18 Ibid., p. 97.


22 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 98.


26 Young, 'The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration'.

27 Young, 'The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF)'; Arnold, 'The South Sudan Defence Force?'.


30 ICG, ‘Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement’.

31 John, The Fate of Sudan, p. 115.

32 Ibid., p. 120; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 235.

33 Small Arms Survey, ‘Armed Groups in Sudan; Young, ‘The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration’.

34 Small Arms Survey, ‘Armed Groups in Sudan’.

35 ICG, ‘Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement’.


38 Young, The Fate of Sudan, p. 120; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 14.

39 Arnold, ‘The South Sudan Defence Force’; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 54.

40 Young, The Fate of Sudan, p. 137.

41 Wolfram Lacher, ‘South Sudan: International State-Building and its Limits’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
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42 ICG, ‘Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan’; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 131.


44 Author interview with a consultant on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, South Sudan, 21 August 2012; ICG, ‘Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan’.

45 Young, The Fate of Sudan, p. 315.

46 Author interview with South Sudan Ministry of Defence, Juba, South Sudan, 30 August 2012; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 199.


48 Author interview with the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR, Juba, 20 August 2012; author interview with former senior official, South Sudan Ministry of Defence, Juba, 30 August 2012.


50 Author interview with UNMISS DDR, Juba, 20 August 2012; author interview with subject-matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, 25 August 2012. See also Lacher, ‘South Sudan’.

51 Author interview with UNMISS DDR, Juba, 31 August 2012.


53 Author interview with UNMISS DDR, Juba, 31 August 2012; author interview with subject-matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, South Sudan, 25 August 2012.

54 Author interview with subject-matter expert on South Sudan, Juba, 25 August 2012.


58 Young, ‘The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration’.


61 Estimates of the SPLA parade vary widely. At the signing of the CPA, it was believed to comprise 90,000 personnel. With the integration of armed groups, it was believed, as of autumn 2010, to total 140,000; see Rands, ‘In Need of Review’. At independence, it was believed to number 207,000, as per John A Snowden, ‘Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012’, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Working Paper No. 27, June 2012, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-27-Security-Force-Development-in-South-Sudan.pdf>, accessed 14 November 2013. Since then, it has grown due to recruitment and re-enlistment and may presently count up to 230,000 men, as per author interview with a consultant on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, 21 August 2012.

62 Snowden, ‘Work in Progress’; author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, 1 September 2012.

63 Author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, 1 September 2012; Young, The Fate of Sudan, p. 316; Rands, ‘In Need of Review’; Lacher, ‘South Sudan’.

64 Author interview with subject-matter expert, University of Juba, 29 August 2012.

65 Author interview with subject-matter expert, University of Juba, 23 August 2012; ICG, ‘Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts’.

66 McEvoy and LeBrun, ‘Uncertain Future’.

67 Author interview with consultants on South Sudan’s security sector, Juba, 1 September 2012.

68 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 151.

69 Author interview with subject-matter expert on the SPLA, Juba, 21 August 2012; author interview with UNMISS DDR, Juba, 20 August 2012; ICG, ‘Compounding Instability in Unity State’.

70 Author interview with South Sudan Ministry of Defence, Juba, 30 August 2012.